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Abstract
Forming a military coalition during an international crisis can improve a state’s
chances of achieving its political goals. We argue that the involvement of a coalition,
however, can have unintended adverse effects on crisis outcomes by complicating the
bargaining process and extending the duration of crises. This argument suggests that
crises involving coalitions should be significantly longer than crises without coalitions.
However, other factors that affect crisis duration are also likely to influence coalition
formation. Therefore, taking into account the endogeneity of the presence of a coali-
tion is essential to testing our hypothesis. To deal with this inferential challenge we
develop a new statistical model that is an extension of instrumental variable estimation
in survival analysis. Our analysis of 255 post-World War II interstate crises demon-
strates that, even after accounting for the endogeneity of coalition formation, military
coalitions tend to extend the duration of crises by approximately 284 days.
Keywords
Coalitions, Crisis, Military Cooperation, Bargaining, Instrumental Variable
Replication Statement
Replication files are available in the JOP Data Archive on Dataverse
(https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jop).
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Introduction
Military coalitions are groups of states that collaborate during an international crisis to
issue threats of collective military action. Acting through a military coalition rather than
unilaterally can improve a state’s chances of achieving its political goals. As a result, states
involved in crises have incentives to form military coalitions. More than 20 percent of
interstate crises from 1946 to 2001 involve a military coalition.1 The cost of forming a
coalition is often understood as the compensation that must be provided to partners that
may not have the same interests as the coalition-builder (Wolford 2015). Thus, coalition-
builders face a tradeoff between obtaining additional military power and making policy
concessions to coalition partners.
We argue, however, that seeking the assistance of a coalition can come at an additional,
potentially more deadly, cost. More specifically, coalitions can prolong international crises
and increase the time participants spend bargaining under the threat of war. Our argument
is based on the notion that the presence of a coalition can hinder the bargaining process
that precedes any peaceful deal that is reached. A coalition adds the additional phase of
bargaining between partners and complicates bargaining with the adversary.
Extending the duration of crises generates a variety of undesirable costs for the partici-
pants. The most obvious of these costs are those associated with being in a constant state
of war preparedness. Crises often involve the mobilization of substantial amounts of troops
and equipment, the procurement of armaments, regular surveillance of the opposition, and
extensive war planning. In addition to these direct costs, there is a large body of evidence
that suggests crises harm a participant’s economy (e.g., Rigobon and Sack 2005, Zussman
et al. 2008, Hoffmann and Neuenkirch 2017). These direct and indirect costs continue to
add up over the course of a crisis and come at the expense of other more productive ends,
making prolonged crises exceptionally costly. Perhaps most concerning, however, is evidence
1This figure is based on the data analyzed below.
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that increased duration raises the chances of a crisis turning violent (DeRouen and Goldfinch
2005). This suggests that the involvement of a military coalition may not only raise the costs
of the crisis for the participants but also put them at a greater risk for war.
Thus, estimating the effect of a military coalition on crisis duration is important to
academics and policy-makers alike. However, in estimating this relationship we face a signif-
icant inferential problem. Other factors that affect crisis duration are also likely to influence
coalition formation. Disputants may prefer to form coalitions in crises that are particularly
intractable. Thus, coalitions would tend to be present in crises that are expected to last
longer for reasons other than coalition involvement, positively biasing our estimate of the
relationship. However, other states may only be willing to join more minor crises that are
easier to resolve. This would result in coalitions being present in inherently shorter crises,
negatively biasing our estimate of the relationship. If not addressed, a positive bias would
cause us to overestimate the effect of a military coalition on crisis duration and a negative
bias would cause us to underestimate the effect.
To address this inferential challenge we develop a new statistical model that is an exten-
sion of instrumental variable estimation in survival analysis. The model estimates coalition
formation and crisis duration jointly. This model explicitly incorporates the correlation be-
tween the two processes into our estimates, controlling for any bias generated by the coalition
formation process. The results from our joint model provide strong support for the theoreti-
cal argument. An analysis of 255 post-WWII interstate crises demonstrates that, even after
controlling for the endogeneity of coalitions, the involvement of a military coalition tends to
extend the duration of crises by approximately 284 days.
This research proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the role of military
coalitions in crises. We then argue that the presence of a coalition can lengthen crises and
explain how the endogeneity of coalition formation presents a challenge for evaluating the
argument. Following that, we describe the research design we use to address the potential
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endogeneity and test our hypothesis. In the fourth section, we present our empirical results,
and in the final section, we discuss the broad implications of our findings and provide several
suggestions for future research.
Military Coalitions and Foreign Policy Crises
In pursuit of political goals, states sometimes resort to military threats. Military threats
can help states obtain valuable concessions from other states. Notably, these threats trigger
international crises. A state involved in a crisis experiences a threat to one or more of its
basic values and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities (Brecher and
Wilkenfeld 1997). Crises do not necessarily result in war and often end without violence, as
the Cuban Missile Crisis did in 1962. However, some crises, such as the July Crisis of 1914,
are not resolved peacefully and can be accompanied by war.2
A key factor in determining whether a state achieves a favorable outcome in a crisis is its
relative capabilities. If a crisis escalates to war, the side with greater military capabilities,
all else equal, would be expected to have the crisis resolved in its favor. This is due to the
side with greater capabilities being more likely to achieve military victory. However, even
if the crisis never escalates to war, the side with greater military capabilities will be better
able to achieve a more favorable outcome. This is because any negotiated outcome will be
shaped by expectations of the result that would be produced by the outside option of war
(e.g., Fearon 1995, Powell 1999). Thus, a state benefits from having its threats backed by
more military capabilities.
Recognizing the important role relative military capabilities play in shaping crisis out-
comes highlights the incentives states involved in crises have for forming military coalitions.
A military coalition is a group of states that threaten to use force together against another
state (or states). An obvious advantage of being part of a coalition is having additional
2See Wolford (2014b) for research on how coalitions affect the probability of crises escalating to war.
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military power available. In other words, states aggregate their capabilities through the for-
mation of military coalitions. Given the impact of relative power on crisis outcomes, coalition
formation, unsurprisingly, can help states obtain more favorable outcomes in crises. In fact,
Morey (2016) demonstrates that for crises that escalate to war, coalitions are more likely to
be victorious than states fighting outside a coalition.
Although coalition partners provide a state involved in a crisis clear benefits, their in-
volvement comes at a cost. The coalition-builder must compensate its partners for their
cooperation in crisis bargaining and possible war (Wolford 2015). Compensation can involve
modifying war aims, strategy adjustments, dividing the spoils of victory, and/or costly side
payments. Thus, states deciding whether to enlist the help of coalition partners in a crisis
face a tradeoff between obtaining additional military power and making policy concessions to
coalition partners. A growing body of research analyzes when states will make this tradeoff
and form coalitions in times of crisis (Kreps 2011, Pilster 2011, Wolford and Ritter 2016) as
well as when other states will agree to join (Tago 2007, Tago 2014).3
Although paying the price to enlist the help of a coalition partner can improve a state’s
chances of victory in a crisis, research suggests that the presence of coalition partners can
create new political challenges if victory is achieved. More specifically, Wolford (2017) sug-
gests that victorious coalitions face unique bargaining problems. Unlike unilateral victors,
a victorious coalition must agree on a division of the new status quo and how it will be
defended. This creates opportunities for the break down of post-conflict peace that are not
present in the absence of a coalition.
In the next section, we build on the notion that coalitions introduce a new set of bargain-
ing obstacles to a crisis. However, we argue that these obstacles are not unique to victorious
coalitions negotiating a post-conflict peace. Coalitions can create bargaining obstacles dur-
ing crises, lengthening their duration. The concern during the crisis is not necessarily that
3A related body of research addresses the conditions that lead states to defect from coalitions (Choi 2012,
Pilster et al. 2013, Weisiger 2016)
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the coalition partners will turn on one another, but that a peaceful settlement will be de-
layed, extending the costly contest and increasing the chances of violence erupting between
the two sides. We begin the next section by explaining how peaceful settlements are reached
in crisis and then how coalitions can extend this process through two mechanisms.
Military Coalitions and Crisis Duration
During a crisis, states bargain under the threat of war. That is, states disagree over the
division of some good and at least one side threatens to wage war if its demands are not
met. A crisis ends when a mutually agreed upon division of the disputed good is located.
Agreements that end crises are often accompanied by an event, such as a troop withdrawal
or cease-fire, that marks the reduction in threat perceptions and conflictual activity to levels
that existed prior to the crisis trigger (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997).
As discussed above, a coalition can help a state achieve a better outcome than if it
acts alone. However, despite this discernible benefit of forming a coalition during a crisis,
we argue that coalitions can severely complicate crisis bargaining and lengthen the duration
states spend in potentially deadly crisis situations. More specifically, we argue that coalitions
can cause the lengthening of crises through two interrelated processes.4
First, the presence of a coalition adds an additional stage of bargaining to the crisis. When
crises involve only the primary disputants, the actors bargain directly with one another over
the disputed good. However, disputants that are members of a coalition must also bargain
with their coalition partner(s). In the absence of coalition partners, a disputant only needs
to consider its own interests, but acting as part of a coalition requires a disputant to take
into account the preferences of its partners. If a partner’s demands are not met, it can simply
4While in many formal bargaining models the actors come to agreement without delay, Kennan and Wilson
(1993) demonstrate that with uncertainty bargaining delays are possible. Given the inherent uncertainty in
interstate crises, our argument is more in-line with incomplete information bargaining models that allow for
bargaining delay.
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refuse to participate in the coalition.
The bargaining that occurs among coalition members determines the terms of cooperation
and, as a result, the price a disputant pays for the assistance of a coalition. Intracoalitional
bargaining typically revolves around developing a joint strategy for dealing with the adver-
sary. Coalition members often have divergent preferences over the deals they are willing
to accept from the other side, the level of escalation they are willing to tolerate, and the
resources they are willing to contribute. Coming to agreement on a collective crisis strategy
can take considerable time. For example, at the height of the Cold War during the 1958
crisis over the Berlin Deadline, it took the Western powers several rounds of negotiations to
form a response to the Soviet’s demand for the demilitarization of West Berlin.5 A similar
process took place at the start of the post-Cold War period when the United States nego-
tiated extensively through a variety of channels to build a large coalition that eventually
coerced Iraq into withdrawing from Kuwait in 1991.6
Second, beyond adding another bargaining stage, coalitions can complicate the bargaining
process with the adversary. In crises without coalitions, the disputants spend time negoti-
ating with one another and figuring out what deals would be acceptable to the other side.
This process is often obstructed by information asymmetries and incentives the disputants
have to misrepresent that information (e.g., Fearon 1995). Involving a coalition can magnify
this obstacle to crisis bargaining. When a coalition is involved, the adversary has to deter-
mine the bargaining position of multiple actors and try to discern how those preferences will
be aggregated into a coalitional position. In negotiations over the demilitarization of West
Berlin, for example, Soviet leadership had to consider the interests of multiple opponents, the
United States, France, Britain, and West Germany, and then discern how their preferences
would be aggregated to form a collective response.
Navigating this more complex bargaining interaction takes additional time. Sorting
5See ICB Crisis #168 for more details.
6See ICB Crisis #393 for more details. Also, see Kreps (2011) for examples of this phenomenon in a
broader set of US-led coalitions in the post-Cold War period.
8
through the positions of multiple opponents and the credibility of each requires more ex-
tensive information gathering and analysis than when faced with a single opponent. More-
over, the involvement of multiple opponents often generates multiple negotiation fronts. For
example, after invading and occupying Kuwait, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein not only
engaged in talks with Kuwait but also the United States, the USSR, Israel, Arab League
members, and others. Creating these additional negotiation fronts works to extend the time
it takes to locate a deal that is acceptable to all parties and resolve the crisis. The discussion
of these two interrelated processes leads to our central hypothesis:
Coalition Hypothesis: The involvement of a military coalition increases the duration of
an interstate crisis.
Testing our hypothesis and estimating the effect of coalitions on crisis duration can pro-
vide a clearer picture of the tradeoff states face when deciding whether to obtain coalition
partners or act unilaterally in a crisis. However, estimating this relationship is not straight-
forward. There is a potential endogeneity issue with the presence of a military coalition.
The process leading to the presence of a coalition in a crisis can bias our estimate of the
relationship between coalition involvement and crisis duration.
Disputants will most likely pursue coalition partners in crises where they value the issue
under contention highly or, in other words, particularly intractable crises. This is because
compensating coalition partners and coordinating with them is costly, which requires a large
benefit, such as acquiring a highly valued good, to offset. As a result, coalitions will tend
to be involved in crises where the disputants are willing to bargain harder and hold out
longer for a better deal. If this is the case, our estimate of the relationship between coalition
involvement and crisis duration will be positively biased, making it more likely to find support
for our hypothesis.
However, it is also possible potential coalition partners try to avoid the difficult crises
and prefer to get involved in the cases where a solution is more feasible. In these cases,
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coalition-builders may still pursue partners because working through a coalition can defer
some of the costs, and often more importantly, provide legitimacy to their willingness to
resort to war over the issue.7 If coalitions tend to form around these more manageable
crises, it would negatively bias estimates of the hypothesized relationship, making it less
likely to find support for our hypothesis.
Given the strong potential for bias, a valid test of our hypothesis must take into account
all of the factors that influence both the involvement of a coalition and crisis duration.
This task, however, is complicated by the fact that many of the factors that need to be
controlled for are difficult to measure. To confront this challenge we develop and utilize
a new statistical model that is an extension of instrumental variable estimation in survival
analysis. This model, along with the data analyzed, is described in detail in the next section.
Research Design
We analyze the duration of interstate crises spanning from 1946 to 2001 identified by the
International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997).8 We focus on
two-sided crises that involve at least two crisis actors disputing against one another. To
test our coalition hypothesis, we adopt the crisis as the unit of observation; we compare
crisis duration for crises with and without a military coalition, controlling for potential
confounders.9
Crisis duration is defined as the number of days between the initiation and termination
of a crisis. The ICB project considers the initiation of a crisis to occur when there is an event
“which leads decision makers to perceive a threat to basic values, time pressure for response
and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities” (Brecher, Wilkenfeld,
7See both Tago (2007) and Kreps (2011) on the ability of coalitions to provide legitimacy.
8We rely on the ICB version 12 data set available at https://sites.duke.edu/icbdata/ (last accessed
on January 3, 2018).
9Given our theoretical focus on crisis bargaining, we study ICB crises rather than the more common
narrower focus on war duration (e.g., Bennet and Stam 1996).
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Beardsley, James, and Quinn 2016: 10). The termination date for a crisis is when the
actors perceive relations to return to the pre-crisis norm. Primary sources such as speeches,
memoirs, and diaries are used by ICB coders to identify these dates. Crisis duration in our
sample ranges between 2 and 1,462 days. The distribution of crisis duration is skewed to the
right; the mean of crisis duration is about 146 days whereas the median is 70 days.
We identify military coalitions based on the coding of Wolford (2015).10 He defines a
military coalition as “a group of two or more states that makes a threat to use force together
against another state (or states) in an international crisis” (Wolford 2015: 14). The key
part of this definition is that coalitions make threats of collective military action.11 In other
words, coalitions are not simply actors that are on the same side in a crisis; there must
be some evidence of military cooperation for a group of states to be considered a coalition.
There are 255 crises in our sample, 54 of which (21%) involve a coalition on at least one side.
One issue with the 54 crises that involve a military coalition is that for some of them a
coalition is only involved for a part of the life-span of the crisis. Therefore, we need to be
careful to differentiate between cases where a coalition forms and extends the duration of a
crisis and those cases where a coalition joins an ongoing crisis in its late stages. To facilitate
this, we treat coalition involvement as a time-varying covariate and split each crisis into a
non-coalition phase and a coalition phase.12 As a result, coalition involvement is constant
during each crisis-phase and, for those phases with coalitions, crisis duration is only coded
for the period after the coalition is involved. This allows us to ensure that it is the coalition
extending the crisis and not long crises attracting coalitions.
To identify the parts of a crisis that involve a coalition, we rely on the ICB participation
dates of the coalition members. Thus, a coalition is considered present when one side of
the crisis is joined by a state that would qualify as a coalition partner as coded by Wolford
10See Table 2.7 in Wolford (2015) for a list of the coded coalitions.
11It is important to note that coalitions are different from formal military alliances; coalitions can be
formed without an alliance, and not all allied states form military coalitions in times of crisis.
12As is typically done in a standard duration analysis with time-varying covariates, we treat all non-
terminal phases as right-censored.
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(2015).13 Ideally we would like to know the dates coalition members started bargaining
among themselves. However, these dates are not readily available and may be unknown for
many cases due to incentives coalition partners have to conceal their deliberations. As a
result, our test is a conservative one because some of our crisis-phases coded as not involving
a coalition will contain periods of intracoalition bargaining that we would expect to extend
crisis duration.
For the 54 crises where a military coalition is identified, a military coalition is present
throughout the entire course of the crisis in 14 (26%) of them. The remaining 40 crises with
a coalition take three general forms. First, in 9 (17%) crises, the coalition is present at the
start of the crisis but drops out before the crisis terminates. Second, in 19 (35%) of the
crises, the coalition joins an ongoing crisis and stays until its end. Lastly, in 12 (22%) crises,
the coalition joins an ongoing crisis and drops out prior to the crisis ending. This generates
a sample of 307 crisis-phase observations for 255 crises.
Figure 1 shows the observed distribution of crisis duration for all the crises (top panel),
those without a coalition (middle panel), and those that involve a coalition at one point
in their life-span (bottom panel). Consistent with our coalition hypothesis, crisis duration
has a higher mean for crises with a coalition (241 days) than for crises without a coalition
(120 days).14 While this comparison provides preliminary support for our hypothesis, the
remaining discussion explains how we attempt to isolate the impact of a coalition on crisis
duration.
To make a valid comparison of crisis-phases with and without a military coalition, we
need to control for potentially confounding factors that may influence both the presence
13This means that there are some small discrepancies between Wolford’s and our codings of military coali-
tions; Wolford’s data set contains seven additional military coalitions where none of the coalition members
are included as a crisis actor in the ICB data set.
14It is apparent from the histograms that there are two potential outliers, the Second Yugoslavian Crisis
of 1992 and the Democratic Republic of Congo Crisis of 1998, with duration longer than 1,000 days. Addi-
tionally, both of these crises involved a coalition. Therefore, in a robustness check presented below, we drop
these observations from our analysis. Our conclusions do not change when these two cases are excluded from
the analysis.
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Figure 1: Distribution of crisis duration
Note: The figure shows the histograms of observed crisis duration with and without a coalition.
of a coalition and crisis duration in evaluating our coalition hypothesis. We thus control
for two observable variables that might be correlated with both crisis duration and coalition
formation. The first factor we control for is involvement by an intergovernmental organization
(IGO) in the crisis. A coalition may be more likely to be formed when the disputants are
able to acquire an explicit backing from the international community through an IGO; at the
same time, an IGO may be more likely to be involved in crises that are expected to escalate
and last longer (Chiba and Fang 2014). To avoid a positive omitted variable bias, we create
a dummy variable coded 1 if an IGO is involved in a crisis and 0 otherwise. The data are
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based on the information from the ICB data set (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997).
The other factor we control for is the degree of military disparity between the two sides.
We expect crises to be shorter when one side has a clear military advantage over the other
side. Importantly, military disparity will be positively related to our coalition variable when
coalitions provide states with a military advantage and negatively related when coalitions
balance the capabilities of the two sides. Therefore, it has the potential to be an important
control variable.15 The measure is equal to the stronger side’s military capability divided
by the sum of all disputants military capabilities.16 Military capability is operationalized
using the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score from the Correlates of
War (COW) project (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). This variable ranges between 0.5
(power parity) to 1 (power disparity).
In addition to these covariates, we also include fixed effects that control for unit-level
heterogeneities. We utilize the list of “protracted conflicts” from the ICB project to identify
the unit for fixed-effect estimation.17 This list identifies a set of countries, regions, or country-
pairs that experience international crises repeatedly. In our data, 61% of crises occur within
the context of one of 29 different protracted conflicts.18 Fixed-effect models allow us to
make comparisons within each protracted conflict, controlling for factors specific to each
15Military disparity is a function of coalition, which suggests that this variable may well be treated as
a post-treatment variable rather than a potential confounding variable. For this reason, we also estimate
models where it is excluded and our conclusions do not change.
16We also created an alternative operationalization of this variable that excludes the military capabilities
of coalition partners. As we discuss below, we use this alternative measure in our joint model to predict
coalition formation. As a robustness check, we also use the alternative measure instead of the one that
includes the capabilities of coalition partners in the duration equation. Our conclusions do not change in
this alternative specification.
17In a robustness check, we employ an alternative strategy for dealing with crisis-level heterogeneity and
control for the type of issue underlying the crisis. This is done via a set of dummy variables based on
the ICB’s coding of the principal issue area for the crisis actors. Our conclusions do not change when this
alternative specification is used.
18The following is the list of protracted conflicts included in our data with the number of crises that occur
in that conflict in parentheses: Angola (10); Chad–Libya (8); Ethiopia–Somalia (5); Rhodesia (11); Western
Sahara (4); Zaire–Rwanda (2); Costa Rica–Nicaragua (2); Ecuador–Peru (3); Honduras–Nicaragua (5);
Afghanistan–Pakistan (3); China–Vietnam (4); India–Pakistan (11); Indochina (5); Indonesia (4); Korea (2);
North Korea Nuclear (1); Finland–Russia (1); Italy–Albania–Yugoslavia (1); Poland–Russia (2); Yugoslavia
(3); Georgia–Russia (1); Arab–Israel (23); Iran–Iraq (3); Iraq–Kuwait (5); Yemen (3); East–West (20);
Greece–Turkey (8); Taiwan Strait (4); Iraq Regime (4).
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of the protracted conflicts. In other words, we only compare Arab–Israeli crises to other
Arab–Israeli crises rather than, for example, to Indo-Pakistani crises.
However, even after including the covariates and fixed effects described above, there may
be unmeasured factors that limit our ability to draw valid inferences. As discussed in the
previous section, difficult to measure factors, such as the tractability of a crisis, may influence
both crisis duration and the presence of a coalition. If these factors are not controlled for,
our estimates of the hypothesized relationship will be biased. Therefore, we construct a new
statistical model that estimates coalition formation and crisis duration jointly, controlling
for the correlation between unobservable factors that affect the two processes.19
The statistical model is an extension of instrumental variable regression model and shares
some similarities with other multi-equation duration models.20 The model incorporates an
equation for coalition formation and another for crisis duration and allows the error terms
for the two equations to be correlated. Moreover, the correlation coefficient allows us to test
whether the unobservable factors that extend crisis duration make coalition formation more
or less likely. If the unobservable factors make coalition formation more likely, the correla-
tion coefficient will be positive and significant and if they make it less likely the correlation
coefficient will be negative and significant. Estimating the model requires an assumption
about the joint distribution of the correlation between the errors and an identification strat-
egy. The distributional assumptions are discussed in the Appendix and our identification
strategy is explained below.
To facilitate identification of the joint model, the equation for coalition formation should
contain at least one independent variable that does not appear in the duration equation. Such
identifier variables are expected to influence coalition formation, influence crisis duration
19The Appendix contains the derivation of the model.
20See, for example, Boehmke, Morey & Shannon 2006 and Chiba, Martin & Stevenson 2015. Whereas the
duration models introduced in these two articles are designed to address selection bias, our model is designed
to correct endogeneity. However, both sets of models are similar in that they employ a separate equation
to explain either the initial selection or the endogenous regressor. For a discussion of a general statistical
framework to construct multi-equation models to facilitate causal inferences, see Braumoeller et al. (2018).
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indirectly through coalitions, but not influence crisis duration directly. The strategy we
employ to identify our model stems from a large literature that emphasizes the importance
of geography for conflict expansion.21 More specifically, we exploit the finding that states in
close proximity to a conflict, especially contiguous ones, are more likely to intervene (e.g.,
Siverson and Starr 1990, Siverson and Starr 1991, Joyce et al. 2014). It is argued that
this is because geographic proximity increases the feasibility of military involvement for a
state. States further away and separated by borders have more constraints on their ability
to intervene in a dispute. In other words, in terms of Most and Starr’s (1989) classic work,
contiguous states are more likely to have the “opportunity” to participate in a military
coalition. However, importantly for our analysis, once a state decides to get involved, the
duration of the crisis will not be influenced by the geographic characteristics of the joiner.
Both contiguous and non-contiguous coalitions engage in intracoalitional bargaining and
complicate bargaining with the adversary.
To create our identifying variable we count the number of states contiguous to side one
and the number contiguous to side two. We then use the maximum of these two counts.
The idea being that whether the crisis experiences a coalition or not will be more heavily
influenced by the side that has more neighbors. To code contiguity we use the COW Direct
Contiguity dataset (Stinnett et al. 2002). We estimate a model where the coding of this
variable is based solely on states that share a border and a model where contiguity also
includes those states separated by 400 miles of water or less.
For the duration equation of our statistical model, we adopt a parametric duration specifi-
cation. We use model fit statistics to choose between three different parametric specifications
of the underlying hazard. Specifically, we estimate Weibull, Log Normal, and Log Logistic
models and choose the one that bests fits the data in terms of Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC).
21Our identification strategy closely follows one employed by Morey (2016) in an analysis of the impact of
coalitions on interstate war outcomes.
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Empirical Results
Table 1: Duration Models of International Crises, 1946-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coalition 1.161∗∗∗ 1.096∗∗∗ 1.183∗∗∗ 1.110∗∗∗
(0.249) (0.252) (0.249) (0.251)
IGO Involvement 0.267 0.327∗
(0.174) (0.177)
Military Disparity −0.729 −0.949
(0.569) (0.578)
Log(σ) 0.191∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Crisis-phases 307 307 307 307
Crises 255 255 255 255
AIC 884.7 884.3 885.1 883.7
All four models are based on the Log Normal specification. Positive coefficients are
associated with longer duration. Estimates on fixed-effect parameters are omitted for
brevity. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
Before presenting results from our new model, we first report results from single-equation
duration models that do not jointly estimate coalition formation and crisis duration. These
models allow us to gauge the importance of controlling for the endogeneity of coalition for-
mation. The estimation results are presented in Table 1. All four of the models include
protracted conflict-level fixed effects, although the estimated coefficients for the 30 fixed-
effect terms are not shown for purposes of brevity. The coefficients for the independent
variables are shown in the accelerated failure time metric; positive estimates are associated
with longer duration and negative estimates are associated with shorter duration. As men-
tioned above, we estimate three different parametric duration models for each of the four
combinations of independent variables to choose the best fitting parametrization for the un-
derlying risk of crisis termination. As it turns out, the Log Normal specification performs
the best in all four models. The estimated σ is approximately 1.2 across all four models,
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Figure 2: Impact of coalition on crisis duration from single-equation model
Note: The figure shows the predicted mean crisis duration for crises with and without a coalition based on
the best-fitting model in Table 1, Model 4. The two independent variables are held constant at their median
value, and fixed-effect parameters are set at values for crises that occur outside a protracted conflict. Mean
duration is calculated by numerically integrating the estimated survivor function.
suggesting that the hazard rate rises to its peak quickly then falls.22
We find consistent support for the Coalition Hypothesis from all four models; the esti-
mated coefficient for the coalition variable is positive and statistically significant, whether we
control for IGO involvement, military disparity, or both. To illustrate the substantive effect
of a coalition on crisis duration, we calculate predicted mean duration for crises with and
without a coalition based on the best-fitting model in Table 1, Model 4, holding constant
the IGO involvement and military disparity variables at their median values (1 and 0.84,
respectively). The fixed-effect parameters are set at the values for crises that occur outside
any protracted conflict.
22Since σ must be constrained to be positive, we estimate Log(σ) instead. We can obtain the value of σ
by exponentiating the estimated logged σ.
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Figure 2 plots the predicted crisis duration for the two scenarios. 23 The predicted mean
duration for crises without a coalition is about 128 days; the predicted crisis duration rises
to 384 days when a crisis involves a coalition. The estimated impact of having a coalition
on crisis duration is therefore 256 days with the 95% confidence interval of (114, 458). This
represents a 200% increase in the estimated crisis duration. Thus, our single-equation models
indicate that the presence of a coalition is having a large substantive impact on the duration
of crises.
Although the models in Table 1 provide support for the Coalition Hypothesis, they do
not completely rule out our concerns of endogeneity. Therefore, Table 2 reports estimation
results from our joint models of coalition formation and crisis duration. The first part of the
table reports estimated coefficients for variables included in the crisis duration equation and
the second part reports those included in the coalition formation equation. The third part
of the table reports the estimated correlation coefficient for each model, which denotes the
correlation between the errors in the two equations. As before, the protracted conflict fixed
effect coefficients are not reported for purposes of brevity. Model 5 is our main model and
Models 6 through 8 provide important robustness checks.
The first piece of information to note from Table 2 is that the estimated correlation
parameter is negative and statistically significant across all four models.24 This indicates that
our joint model is necessary to test our hypothesis and that unobserved factors were biasing
the estimates from the single-equation models. Moreover, it suggests that unobservables
that contribute to shorter crises also make coalition formation more likely. In other words,
coalitions form during inherently shorter crises, negatively biasing our previous estimates.
23For all figures, uncertainty estimates are obtained by following the procedure proposed by King, Tomz,
and Wittenberg (2000).
24Since the correlation coefficient, ρ, must be between −1 and 1, we estimate the inverse of hyperbolic
tangent of ρ.
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Table 2: Joint Models of Coalition Formation and Crisis Duration, 1946-2001
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Main Land Duration Coalition
border outliers outliers
Crisis duration
Coalition 3.364∗∗∗ 3.186∗∗∗ 3.370∗∗∗ 3.650∗∗∗
(0.514) (0.606) (0.514) (0.335)
IGO Involvement 0.108 0.139 0.103 0.093
(0.202) (0.199) (0.202) (0.202)
Military Disparity −1.200∗∗ −1.142∗ −1.190∗∗ −1.074∗
(0.603) (0.611) (0.604) (0.596)
Log(σ) 0.312∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.075) (0.069) (0.056)
Coalition formation
IGO Involvement 0.787∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 0.762∗∗∗
(0.274) (0.278) (0.274) (0.262)
Military Disparity 0.547 0.630 0.533 0.567
(w/out coalition) (0.680) (0.704) (0.679) (0.650)
# Neighbors (land + sea) 0.074∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
# Neighbors (land) 0.115∗∗∗
(0.037)
Constant −3.049∗∗∗ −3.127∗∗∗ −3.040∗∗∗ −3.100∗∗∗
(0.682) (0.707) (0.681) (0.665)
Correlation
ρ −0.842∗∗∗ −0.793∗∗∗ −0.843∗∗∗ −0.913∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.156) (0.114) (0.049)
Crisis-phases 307 307 305 305
Crises 255 255 253 253
AIC 3150.9 3151.0 3150.2 3110.4
All three models are based on the Log Normal specification. Positive coefficients in the
crisis duration equation are associated with longer duration. Estimates on fixed-effect
parameters included in the duration equation are omitted for brevity. Standard errors
in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10
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Figure 3 plots the predicted crisis duration for the two scenarios based on our joint model.
The predicted mean duration for crises without a coalition is about 12 days; the predicted
crisis duration rises to 296 days when a crisis involves a coalition. The estimated impact of
having a military coalition on crisis duration is therefore 284 days with the 95% confidence
interval of (163, 488), approximately one month longer than the estimate obtained from
the single-equation model. Moreover, the revised estimates indicate that the involvement of
a coalition causes a 2,367% increase in the estimated crisis duration, which is substantially
larger than the percentage increase obtained from the single-equation model. Thus, failing to
control for the endogeneity issue with our joint model underestimates the effect of a coalition
on crisis duration. Our revised estimates suggest that a crisis without a coalition would last
less than two weeks but if that crisis were to involve a coalition it would be extended by
more than 9 months. This finding indicates that soliciting the help of coalition partners can
come at a significant cost for a state.
In addition to our main model, Table 2 presents several notable modifications to our joint
model. First, we examine the robustness of our result to a reasonable alternative coding of
our identifying variable. More specifically, Model 6 demonstrates that the result holds even
when we restrict neighbors to those states sharing a border. Second, as mentioned in footnote
13, we drop the two crises where the duration is longer than 1,000 days, the 1992 Second
Yugoslavian Crisis and the 1998 Democratic Republic of Congo Crisis, both of which involve
a coalition. Model 7 indicates that these cases are not driving our results. Lastly, we drop
two cases that have an exceptional number of coalition members. Both the 1990 Gulf War
and the 1999 Kosovo crisis involved 11 coalition members and the next largest coalition in
the data has 5 coalition members. Model 8 demonstrates that the result does not depend
on the inclusion of these two cases.
Unlike the single-equation models in Table 1, the joint models presented in Table 2 provide
information about the determinants of coalition formation. Importantly, the estimates show
that the number of surrounding neighbors significantly increases the probability of coalition
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Figure 3: Impact of coalition on crisis duration from joint model
Note: The figure shows the predicted mean crisis duration for crises with and without a coalition based on
our main model, Model 5. The other independent variables are held constant at their median value, and
fixed-effect parameters are set at values for crises that occur outside a protracted conflict.
formation. This is consistent with our expectations and provides a key piece of evidence in
support of our identification strategy. With regards to the other variables, IGO involvement
increases the probability of a coalition forming but has no effect on crisis duration. Thus,
it is possible that the only effect IGO involvement has on crisis duration is through the
encouragement of coalition formation. Military disparity seems to have no effect on coalition
formation but it consistently shortens crisis duration.
The purpose of our joint model is to control for unmeasured factors related to both
crisis duration and coalition formation. However, our joint model ignores the process by
which states select into crises. Given that previous research suggests initiators select crises
strategically based on whether a target will receive support, we want to ensure that the
sample selection process is not biasing our estimates (Gartner and Siverson 1996, Werner
2000). Therefore, as a robustness check, we test our hypothesis employing a sample selection
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model, Model 9 in Table 3. This model is similar to the one developed by Boehmke, Morey
& Shannon (2006), but our model allows for more flexibility in the correlation coefficient.25
We estimate the model using a sample of all dyad-years.26 The dependent variable for the
selection equation codes whether the dyad experiences an ICB crisis in a given year. Variables
that capture the likelihood of two states having a dispute, such as distance, contiguity, and
similarity of interests between the potential disputants based on UN voting are included in
the selection equation and used to identify the model.27 The results from this model also
provide support for the hypothesis. Moreover, the correlation parameter for this model is
insignificant, indicating that the crisis selection process can be safely ignored for our analysis.
The final set of analyses we conduct disaggregate the coalitions in our sample to con-
sider whether certain types of military coalitions experience longer crises than others. One
natural extension of our argument is that larger coalitions may extend crisis duration more
than smaller coalitions. This is because increasing the number of coalition members may
exacerbate the bargaining problems described above. To test this possibility, Model 10 in
Table 3 replaces our coalition dummy variable with a logged count of the number of coalition
members. The results suggest that increasing the size of a coalition extends the duration of
the crisis. Thus, when states strengthen their coalition through the inclusion of new mem-
bers, they are also extending the duration of the crisis. More specifically, increasing the size
of a coalition from 2 to 3 members, extends the duration of a crisis by approximately 80
days with the 95% confidence interval of (28, 156).
25The derivation of the statistical model is included in the replication materials.
26Dyad-year observations are created based on the COW project’s state system membership list, v2016
available at http://correlatesofwar.org (last accessed on January 3, 2018). We drop six ICB crises that
involve a non-COW member state.
27Variables for the selection model were obtained using the NewGene software (Bennett et al. 2017).
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Table 3: Supplementary Models of International Crises, 1946-2001
(9) (10) (11)
Crisis duration
Coalition 0.986∗∗∗
(0.259)
Coalition size (logged) 1.092∗∗∗
(0.233)
Only 1 Major Power in Coalition 0.946∗∗∗
(0.359)
Other Coalition 1.244∗∗∗
(0.326)
IGO Involvement 0.363∗∗ 0.343∗ 0.325∗
(0.179) (0.176) (0.177)
Military Disparity −0.784 −1.048∗ −0.961∗
(0.615) (0.579) (0.578)
Log(σ) 0.190∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.044) (0.044)
Crisis involvement
Military Disparity 0.180
(0.112)
Distance −0.092∗∗∗
(0.008)
Contiguity 1.059∗∗∗
(0.065)
Interest similarity −0.614∗∗∗
(0.069)
Peace Years −0.110∗∗∗
(0.008)
Peace Years2 0.004∗∗∗
(0.0005)
Peace Years3 −0.00005∗∗∗
(0.000007)
Constant −1.955∗∗∗
(0.131)
Correlation
ρ −0.151
(0.112)
Dyad-years 555,944
Crisis-phases 299 307 307
Crises 249 255 255
AIC 8727.8 880.8 885.2
All three models are based on the Log Normal specification. Positive coefficients in the crisis duration
equation are associated with longer duration. Estimates on fixed-effect parameters included in the
duration equation are omitted for brevity. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗p < 0.10
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One possible strategy for minimizing the obstacles a coalition creates is by forming the
coalition around a single major power. Given that the major power will have the most
capabilities and be essential to the success of the coalition, the other members may defer
to the major power’s bargaining stance, simplifying the bargaining. To test this possibility,
Model 11 in Table 3 includes two coalition variables, one coding those that involve a single
major power and one capturing all other coalitions. The results indicate that both types
of coalitions extend the duration of crises and the effect is slightly smaller for single major
power coalitions but the difference is not significant. Therefore, it seems that even single
major power coalitions generate considerable bargaining obstacles that extend crises. One
possible explanation for this lack of difference between the two types of coalitions is that
minor powers that get included in coalitions are important enough to their coalition’s success
that their preferences get considered in intracoalition bargaining and by the other side.
Future research should continue to consider whether certain types of coalitions experience
shorter crises than other coalitions. It is possible that forming a coalition among states
with similar preferences or that have an existing alliance agreement may alleviate some of
the bargaining obstacles a coalition introduces to a crisis. Analyses along these lines will
provide policy-makers choosing among a set of possible coalition partners a more nuanced
understanding of the implications of any given choice.
Conclusion
Our research highlights an often overlooked cost of military coalition participation. Intro-
ducing a coalition to a crisis can lengthen the crisis and extend the time disputants spend
bargaining under the threat of war. This finding provides a clearer picture to policy-makers of
the tradeoffs associated with achieving foreign policy goals through a coalition. However, in
addition to providing useful insights for policy-makers, our findings have broad implications
for several areas of study.
25
First, our findings contribute to a growing body of research on bargaining delays. Whereas
our focus is on bargaining delays in interstate crises, previous studies examine bargaining
delays, for example, in civil wars (Cunningham 2006) and cabinet formation in parliamen-
tary democracies (Martin and Vanberg 2003, Golder 2010). Similar to our findings, these
studies demonstrate that increases in the number of relevant actors extends the duration of
bargaining. Thus, when taken together, these seemingly disparate areas of research converge
on a more general finding. Future research should seek to identify the broader conditions
under which the involvement of an additional actor contributes to bargaining delay.
Second, our research highlights the importance of intracoalition bargaining. An extensive
body of research in international relations examines various aspects of the bargaining that
occurs between adversaries but our understanding of bargaining among actors on the same
side of a dispute is less developed. Developing an understanding of intracoalition bargaining
is key to understanding when coalitions will form and the price states pay to obtain partners.
Recent research on alliances has made some progress in this area but this work has the benefit
of relying on alliance treaties to extract information about the bargained outcomes among
partners (Johnson 2015). Thus, a systematic analysis of bargained outcomes reached among
coalition partners would entail original data collection but would be a worthwhile effort that
would significantly advance research on the politics of military coalitions.
Finally, the impact of the coalition formation process on our empirical analysis suggests
the need for greater attention to endogenous regressors in international relations research.
A significant body of work in international relations highlights the importance of accounting
for sample selection and strategies for doing so (e.g., Reed 2000, Sartori 2003, Boehmke,
Shannon, and Morey 2006) but the topic of endogenous regressors has received considerably
less attention. Our joint model offers one possible strategy for dealing with this inferential
challenge and will, hopefully, prove useful for others addressing this issue in their research.
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Appendix
We derive a statistical model that estimates the probability of coalition formation and crisis
duration jointly and thereby addresses the endogeneity of coalition formation. For each
international crisis-phase i = 1, ..., n, we define a latent random variable c∗i to represent the
disputants’ propensity to form a coalition. We allow c∗i to be a function of covariates zi and
their coefficients γ, such that
c∗i = ziγ + i, (1)
where i is an error term with a symmetric distribution characterized by a cumulative distri-
bution function F(·). We do not observe the value of c∗i directly; instead we observe ci = 1
(a coalition is formed) when c∗i > 0 and ci = 0 (a coalition is not formed) when c
∗
i ≤ 0.
In addition, we define another random variable t∗i that represents the latent duration for
crisis-phase i, such that
log(t∗i ) = βci + xiδ + α
−1ηi, (2)
where β captures the effect of ci on the duration of crisis-phase, xi is a vector of covariates,
δ is a vector of coefficients, and ηi is an error term with a cumulative distribution function
Fη(·) and density function fη(·), scaled by α.
However, univariate estimation of equation (2) may not give us an unbiased estimate
of β if some unobservable factors influence both c∗i and t
∗
i simultaneously, resulting in a
correlation between i and ηi. For example, suppose a coalition is more likely to be formed
in more “intractable” crises that tend to last longer. This implies that i and ηi will be
positively correlated. Then, when i takes an unusually high value, ηi will on average take
an unusually high value. Unless we account for the correlation between the two terms, we
will overestimate β, because part of the effect of ηi on t
∗
i will be picked up by β. In other
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words, we will incorrectly attribute to β the effect of any part of ηi that is correlated with
i.
To obtain an unbiased estimate of β, we thus need a statistical model that estimates
equations (1) and (2) jointly while controlling for the correlation between i and ηi. The
likelihood function for such a statistical model takes the following form:
L =
n∏
i=1
Pr(t∗i = ti ∩ c∗i > 0)ci(1−di) Pr(t∗i = ti ∩ c∗i ≤ 0)(1−ci)(1−di)
Pr(t∗i > ti ∩ c∗i > 0)cidi Pr(t∗i > ti ∩ c∗i ≤ 0)(1−ci)di , (3)
where ti is the observed duration of a crisis-phase and di is the censoring indicator coded 1
for censored crisis-phases and 0 otherwise. To specify this likelihood function, we need to
characterize a joint distribution of t∗i and c
∗
i . Since t is duration and c is binary, specifying
the joint distribution of the two is not straightforward. We utilize a copula function to bind
together the two univariate probability distributions F(·) and Fη(·) to produce a bivariate
probability distribution.28 Specifically, for two random variables x∗1 and x
∗
2 with associated
univariate distribution functions F1(·) and F2(·), the bivariate distribution can be charac-
terized as F12(x1, x2) = Pr(x
∗
1 < x1 ∩ x∗2 < x2) = C (F1(x1), F2(x2); θ), where C(·, ·; θ) is
a bivariate copula function, and θ is a parameter that measures the degree of association
between x∗1 and x
∗
2.
The first component of (3), the joint probability that a coalition is formed and the crisis-
phase lasted for duration ti is obtained by applying Bayes’ rule and taking the derivatives
28For applications of copula functions in political science, see Chiba, Martin, and Stevenson (2015), Chiba,
Metternich, and Ward (2015), and Fukumoto (2015).
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of the joint distributions, as follows:
Pr(t∗i = ti ∩ c∗i > 0) = Pr(c∗i > 0 | t∗i = ti)× Pr(t∗i = ti) (4)
= Pr(i ≤ ziγ | t∗i = ti)× fη(ti) (5)
=
∂C (F(ziγ), Fη(ti); θ)
∂Fη(ti)
× fη(ti) (6)
= C|η(F(ziγ), Fη(ti); θ)× fη(ti), (7)
where Ca|b(x, y; θ) is called a conditional copula that gives Pr(a < x|b = y). The second
component of (3), the joint probability that coalition is not formed and the crisis lasted for
duration ti is obtained simply by:
Pr(t∗i = ti ∩ c∗i ≤ 0) = Pr(t∗i = ti)− Pr(t∗i = ti ∩ c∗i > 0) (8)
= fη(ti)− C|η(F(ziγ), Fη(ti); θ)× fη(ti). (9)
The third component of (3), the joint probability that coalition is formed and the crisis-
phase is censored at duration ti is
Pr(t∗i > ti ∩ c∗i > 0) = Pr(t∗i > ti ∩ i ≤ ziγ) (10)
= Pr(i ≤ ziγ)− Pr(t∗i ≤ ti ∩ i ≤ ziγ) (11)
= F(ziγ)− C (Fη(ti), F(ziγ);−θ) (12)
= C (1− Fη(ti), F(ziγ); θ) . (13)
Finally, the last component of (3), the joint probability that coalition is not formed and the
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crisis-phase is censored at duration ti is:
Pr(t∗i > ti ∩ c∗i ≤ 0) = Pr(t∗i > ti)− Pr(t∗i > ti ∩ c∗i > 0) (14)
= 1− Fη(ti)− C (1− Fη(ti), F(ziγ); θ) . (15)
From among several different copula functions that can be assigned to C(·, ·; θ), we choose
the Gaussian copula because of its flexibility. It captures the association between the two
random variables via a correlation coefficient ρ, which ranges between −1 (perfect negative
correlation) and 1 (perfect positive correlation). A positive estimate of ρ would indicate
that a coalition is indeed more likely to be formed in crises that tend to last longer. More
importantly, the model enables us to test our hypothesis on the effect of coalitions on crisis
duration, controlling for the endogeneity of coalition formation. We assign Weibull, Log
Normal, and Log Logistic distributions to Fη(·), and choose the one that fits the data better.
We assign a standard normal distribution to F(·) throughout the estimation.
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